In Eclipse Che versions 7.79.0 through 7.121.0, the dashboard backend's POST /dashboard/api/data/resolver endpoint passes a caller-supplied
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 7.122.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
In Eclipse Che versions 7.79.0 through 7.121.0, the dashboard backend's POST /dashboard/api/data/resolver endpoint passes a caller-supplied URL directly to an outbound HTTP GET request with no host filtering. An authenticated user can exploit this server-side request forgery (SSRF) to read responses from internal network addresses, including the cloud instance metadata service (169.254.169.254), loopback interfaces, RFC-1918 private ranges, and in-cluster Kubernetes services. The operator-configured allowlist (spec.devEnvironments.allowedSources.urls) is not consulted. The vulnerability is fixed in version 7.122.0, which adds private-address blocking, IPv4-mapped IPv6 bypass prevention, operator allowlist enforcement, and disables HTTP redirects on the outbound request.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Eclipse Foundation Eclipse Che
From 7.79.0 · fixed in 7.122.0