LightRAG: SSRF via IPv6-transition address bypass (NAT64, IPv4-compatible, 6to4) of the native-markdown image-download guard
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.5.5
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
LightRAG provides simple and fast retrieval-augmented generation. Prior to 1.5.5, _validated_addresses in lightrag/parser/markdown/parser.py evaluates the literal resolved address with ipaddress.is_global without consistently classifying an IPv4 address embedded in an IPv6 transition wrapper. A caller who can upload a Markdown or textpack document can supply an external image URL using NAT64 64:ff9b::/96 or an IPv4-compatible form that embeds a loopback, private, or cloud-metadata IPv4 address. On a deployment with compatible NAT64 or DNS64 routing, _download and _build_guarded_opener accept the wrapper and fetch the internal resource, whose body is then ingested. Current interpreter behavior already blocks some RFC 8215 and 6to4 forms, but the fixed guard handles all documented wrappers without becoming more permissive than the standard library. This issue is fixed in version 1.5.5.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- HKUDS LightRAG
fixed in 1.5.5
- lightrag-hkuPyPI
fixed in 1.5.5