TREK: SSRF Guard Bypass via IPv6 Transition Addresses (NAT64/6to4)
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 3.4.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
TREK is a collaborative travel planner. Prior to 3.4.0, the checkSsrf logic in server/src/utils/ssrfGuard.ts does not recognize NAT64, 6to4, or Teredo IPv6 transition addresses that encode an IPv4 destination. An authenticated user who controls a DNS record can supply a URL whose AAAA result is a transition address embedding a private, loopback, or link-local IPv4 target, and isAlwaysBlocked and isPrivateNetwork classify the address as allowed. In a deployment that routes the applicable transition format, user-facing imports, webhooks, integrations, or plugin egress can reach internal services or cloud metadata and expose returned information. This issue is fixed in version 3.4.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- liketrek TREK
fixed in 3.4.0