Pika Unauthenticated Replication Access via Internal Protobuf Port
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
PikiwiDB (Pika) v3.5.7 exposes an internal protobuf replication server on a port derived from the client port plus 2000 (e.g. 11221 when the default client port 9221 is used) that does not authenticate incoming requests. Although requirepass is intended to gate replication — a slave presents it as masterauth inside its MetaSync request — only the MetaSync handler (HandleMetaSyncRequest) validates it; the frame dispatcher (DealMessage) does not require a completed or attempted MetaSync before routing other message types to their handlers. As a result, an unauthenticated remote attacker can connect directly to the replication port and issue TrySync, DBSync, BinlogSync, and RemoveSlaveNode requests, obtaining the full-sync snapshot and live write stream and removing replica nodes, even when requirepass is configured.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- OpenAtomFoundation pikiwidb
through 4.0.4-alpha