joi: Prototype pollution via a `__proto__` language key in custom messages
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 17.13.6, 18.2.5
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
joi is a schema description language and data validator for JavaScript. From 16.0.0 until 17.13.6 and 18.2.5, the @hapi/joi package through 17.1.1 and the successor joi package contain prototype pollution in lib/messages.js, where exports.compile() and exports.merge() reuse inherited objects for attacker-controlled language keys supplied through messages(), message(), prefs({ messages }), Joi.extend({ messages }), or rule({ message }). A language key named proto writes properties onto Object.prototype, and constructor writes to the Object function's static properties. A consuming application that gates on the presence of an inherited property can take the wrong branch for every inspected object. The flaw is not reachable from data that joi validates and requires an application to feed untrusted input directly into schema-construction configuration. This issue is fixed in joi versions 17.13.6 and 18.2.5; no fixed @hapi/joi version is available.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- hapijs joi
From 16.0.0 · through 17.1.1; From 17.2.0 · fixed in 17.13.6; From 18.0.0 · fixed in 18.2.5
- joinpm
From 17.2.0 · fixed in 17.13.6
- @hapi/joinpm
From 16.0.0 · through 17.1.1
- joinpm
From 18.0.0 · fixed in 18.2.5