xmldom: DocType `name` Injection Bypasses requireWellFormed
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.9.12, 0.8.15
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. Prior to @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12, and in xmldom version 0.6.0 and earlier, the DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE branch in lib/dom.js validates publicId, systemId, and internalSubset under requireWellFormed: true but emits DocumentType.name verbatim. A name containing > or whitespace can terminate the <!DOCTYPE ...> declaration and inject sibling markup; the value can be supplied through createDocumentType() on the 0.8.x and unscoped lines or through a direct DocumentType.name property write on every affected line. The default path and legacy creation-time behavior remain permissive, while the vulnerable strict path fails to enforce an XML Name. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12; no fixed version is available for xmldom.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- xmldom xmldom
through 0.6.0
- @xmldom xmldom
From 0.9.0 · fixed in 0.9.12; From 0.7.0 · fixed in 0.8.15
- @xmldom/xmldomnpm
From 0.7.0 · fixed in 0.8.15
- @xmldom/xmldomnpm
From 0.9.0 · fixed in 0.9.12
- xmldomnpm
through 0.6.0