xmldom: Element name injection via createElement() bypasses requireWellFormed
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.8.14, 0.9.11
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. Prior to @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.14 and 0.9.11, and in xmldom version 0.6.0 and earlier, Document.createElement(tagName) stores an unvalidated element name and XMLSerializer.serializeToString() emits that name verbatim. The requireWellFormed: true path did not validate the element qualified name or synthesized xmlns:PREFIX declaration, so attacker-controlled tag names could inject attributes, elements, or processing instructions into serialized XML or HTML and could cause cross-site scripting when browser-consumed. The unchecked values violate the XML QName constraint, and default serialization and creation-time createElement() behavior remain permissive. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.14 and 0.9.11; no fixed version is available for xmldom.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- xmldom xmldom
through 0.6.0
- @xmldom xmldom
From 0.7.0 · fixed in 0.8.14; From 0.9.0 · fixed in 0.9.11
- @xmldom/xmldomnpm
From 0.9.0 · fixed in 0.9.11
- @xmldom/xmldomnpm
From 0.7.0 · fixed in 0.8.14
- xmldomnpm
through 0.6.0