FrankenPHP: Cross-request PHP session ID leak in worker mode when the session extension is a shared module
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.12.5
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
FrankenPHP is a modern application server for PHP. Prior to 1.12.5, FrankenPHP worker mode can retain PHP session state between requests when the session extension is loaded as a shared module and is unavailable through HAVE_PHP_SESSION at compile time. In this build configuration, frankenphp_reset_session_state() is compiled out, PS(id) can survive a request boundary, and a subsequent session_start() can ignore the new request's cookie because an identifier is already present. Under concurrent requests, session_id() can therefore return another client's identifier or a stale identifier from a previous request on the same worker thread, causing cross-user session exposure, possible session hijacking, and intermittent logout behavior. Builds with the session extension statically linked, including the official static binaries and Docker images, are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 1.12.5.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- php frankenphp
fixed in 1.12.5
- github.com/dunglas/frankenphpGo
fixed in 1.12.5