Corosync: corosync: integer overflow in check_memb_commit_token_sanity may bypass message length validation on 32-bit systems
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
An integer overflow was found in Corosync's handling of membership commit token messages. The length-validation check for these messages can be bypassed on 32-bit systems due to an integer overflow in the calculation of the expected message length, allowing a crafted network packet to trigger an out-of-bounds memory access that crashes the Corosync daemon. This results in a denial of service for the affected cluster node. The overflow does not occur on 64-bit systems, where the length calculation is correctly performed in 64-bit arithmetic.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- corosync
Version range not reported
- corosync
Version range not reported
- corosync
Version range not reported
- corosync
Version range not reported
- openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-9
Version range not reported
- rhcos
Version range not reported