io_uring/query: cap user size passed to copy_struct_to_user
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 6.18.50, 7.2.4
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/query: cap user size passed to copy_struct_to_user io_handle_query_entry() clamps hdr.size for the inbound copy_from_user() but keeps the original user value as usize. copy_struct_to_user() uses that usize and, when it is larger than the kernel result, clear_user()s the trailing bytes. As hdr.size is a __u32, a query can request nearly 4 GiB of zeroing, including on the error path where res_size stays 0. The interface is reachable without a ring via IORING_REGISTER_QUERY. Reject sizes larger than PAGE_SIZE, as recommended for copy_struct_* interfaces.
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
From c265ae75f900cea4e415230a77b5d152377627dd · fixed in 417e02f7b6051765b91cf1289071882eebd172e0; From c265ae75f900cea4e415230a77b5d152377627dd · fixed in 2b8ad4981ecedb14c1fdd811ab977010b23933e6; From c265ae75f900cea4e415230a77b5d152377627dd · fixed in ba77efee1b95b4ad7559b1cdbe7cd7fa36dca95b
- Linux Linux
6.18
- KernelLinux
From 6.18.0 · fixed in 6.18.50; From 6.19.0 · fixed in 7.2.4