sysctl: move the "cad_pid" entry from pid_table[] to kern_reboot_table[]
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 6.18.50, 7.2.4
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sysctl: move the "cad_pid" entry from pid_table[] to kern_reboot_table[] cad_pid is global, and kill_cad_pid() is only used in the root namespace. However, due to pid_table_root_permissions(), a non-root user can unshare pid/user namespaces and modify it from the child namespace. This makes no sense and is simply wrong. Move it to kern_reboot_table[] where it logically belongs; this ensures that only GLOBAL_ROOT_UID can read/modify this sysctl. Note that this patch doesn't preserve "#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL" around the "cad_pid"; CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL selects CONFIG_SYSCTL, so it is always set when kern_reboot_table[] is compiled.
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
From e054bcbe7e7af2baad3752f1a4916a7fffc0457e · fixed in e8527de7fea191fda704792a56081f9009aeec37; From e054bcbe7e7af2baad3752f1a4916a7fffc0457e · fixed in a09bc4eaa67e1a72df3b6d0beb3afeef1e1fdfcd; From e054bcbe7e7af2baad3752f1a4916a7fffc0457e · fixed in 7170ca01623b399c97f2ae9d3e228badc1f25ea3
- Linux Linux
6.17
- KernelLinux
From 6.17.0 · fixed in 6.18.50; From 6.19.0 · fixed in 7.2.4