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CVE-2026-79785

X-AnyLabeling before 4.0.0-beta.9 Improper Certificate Validation in Model Downloads

Published
Last modified
published
Not listed in CISA KEV
Fix
Fixed in 4.0.0-beta.9, 4.0.0b9
None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
  • Exploitation: none
  • Automatable: no
  • Technical impact: partial

Summary

X-AnyLabeling's model downloader disabled TLS certificate verification. download_with_retry in anylabeling/services/auto_labeling/model.py built a context with ssl._create_unverified_context() and passed it to urllib.request.urlopen, so neither the certificate chain nor the hostname was checked on any model download, and models are fetched over HTTPS from the project's release host. Any party positioned to intercept that connection could therefore answer it with content of their own choosing. The response is written to a .part file and moved into place with os.replace, and the only post-download check, safe_check_model, validates the file's format rather than its provenance: no hash or signature is compared against an expected value. For an ONNX target the substituted file passes onnx.checker.check_model and is then used for inference, so the attacker chooses the model that produces the application's annotations. For a .pth or .pt target, which the shipped SAM2 video, YOLOE, UPN and open_vision configurations use, the check worker calls torch.load without weights_only, so a substituted file is unpickled and executes code of the attacker's choosing on PyTorch releases predating the weights_only default.

Timeline

  1. CVE published
  2. CISA SSVC assessment

    Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial

  3. Record last updated

Affected versions

  • CVHub520 X-AnyLabeling

    fixed in 4.0.0-beta.9

  • CVHub520 X-AnyLabeling

    fixed in 4.0.0b9

References 6

GitHub · CVHub520/X-AnyLabeling

pypi.org

vulncheck.com