Termix: Hardcoded default key encrypts all OIDC/WebAuthn users' stored SSH credentials — full offline decryption from a database copy
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2.5.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Termix is a web-based server management platform with SSH terminal, tunneling, and file editing capabilities. From 1.7.0 until 2.5.1, Termix derives the keys that wrap OIDC and WebAuthn users' Data Encryption Keys from committed default strings and the public userId salt in src/backend/utils/user-crypto.ts. Because OIDC_SYSTEM_SECRET and WEBAUTHN_SYSTEM_SECRET are not configured by the project's default deployment artifacts, an attacker with an offline SQLite database copy can derive the wrapping key, recover each affected user's DEK, and decrypt stored SSH passwords, private keys, and key passphrases. Password-authenticated users are not affected by this specific key derivation path. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.1.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Termix-SSH Termix
From 1.7.0 · fixed in 2.5.1