MCPHub: SSRF Guard Bypass via IPv6 Transition Addresses in URL Validation
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.0.32
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
MCPHub is a unified hub for centrally managing and dynamically orchestrating multiple MCP servers/APIs into separate endpoints with flexible routing strategies. Prior to version 1.0.32, MCPHub's SSRF guard in src/utils/ssrf.ts uses a custom isBlockedIpv6 function that only checks for loopback, link-local, unique-local, IPv4-mapped, and IPv4-compatible IPv6 addresses. IPv6 transition address families -- NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96), 6to4 (2002::/16), and Teredo (2001::/32) -- are not checked. An attacker who can specify a URL for an MCP server connection can encode a private IPv4 address inside one of these IPv6 forms to bypass the SSRF guard and reach internal infrastructure. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.32.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- samanhappy mcphub
fixed in 1.0.32