JSON path injection via unescaped get_path segments in AshSqlite
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.2.18
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic vulnerability in ash-project ash_sqlite allows an attacker who controls a get_path/2 segment to traverse into nested JSON the application never exposed, disclosing private or sensitive? embedded fields. AshSqlite.SqlImplementation builds the SQLite json_extract path with "$." <> Enum.join(right, "."), so a single segment containing ., [, ], or $ re-interprets the JSON path (for example "private.secret" descends two levels instead of naming one key). The path is bound as a parameter, so this is confined to the JSON-path grammar rather than SQL. Any endpoint that lets user input reach a get_path segment (a common pick-a-field pattern) can read nested values it never meant to expose. This issue affects ash_sqlite: from 0.1.2-rc.0 before 0.2.18.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- ash_sqlite
From 0.1.2-rc.0 · fixed in 0.2.18
- ash-project/ash_sqlite
Version range not reported