Timing Side-Channel in SM2 Signature Generation
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 4.0.3, 3.6.5, 3.5.9, 3.4.8, 3.0.23, and 1 more
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Issue summary: SM2 signature generation uses non-constant-time arithmetic on secret values, forming a timing side-channel. Impact summary: An attacker able to measure SM2 signing times may learn information about the per-signature secret nonce, which over many signatures can, via a lattice / Hidden Number Problem attack, lead to recovery of the private key. CWE: CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy Description: SM2 signature generation computes the signature value using variable-time BIGNUM operations on the secret nonce and the private key, so the time taken to produce an SM2 signature depends on these secret values, forming a timing side-channel. Applications performing SM2 signature generation are affected on all platforms. FIPS Impact: no SM2 is not a FIPS algorithm.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- OpenSSL OpenSSL
From 4.0.0 · fixed in 4.0.3; From 3.6.0 · fixed in 3.6.5; From 3.5.0 · fixed in 3.5.9; From 3.4.0 · fixed in 3.4.8; From 3.0.0 · fixed in 3.0.23; From 1.1.1 · fixed in 1.1.1zj