VeraCrypt: Missing authorization on veracrypt.sys IOCTLs exposes disk topology, symlink targets, and DeviceObject reference count to any client of \\.\VeraCrypt
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
VeraCrypt provides disk encryption with strong security based on TrueCrypt. In 1.26.29 and earlier, selected metadata IOCTL handlers in the VeraCrypt Windows veracrypt.sys driver accept caller-supplied object-manager and device paths broader than supported VeraCrypt workflows require. A local user who can open the intentionally user-accessible \.\VeraCrypt device can use TC_IOCTL_GET_RESOLVED_SYMLINK, TC_IOCTL_GET_DRIVE_PARTITION_INFO, VC_IOCTL_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY_EX, or the legacy TC_IOCTL_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY handler to make src/Driver/Ntdriver.c perform kernel-context symbolic-link or disk-device lookups outside the intended path scope. This can disclose low-sensitivity drive-letter targets, partition information, disk geometry, GPT or MBR state, and limited object-manager path metadata.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- veracrypt VeraCrypt
through 1.26.29