Tinyauth: Unauthenticated login attempts can trigger global login lockdown denial of service
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 5.1.0, 1.0.1-0.20260715123057-dade1e2c8f27
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Tinyauth is an authentication and authorization server. Prior to 5.1.0, an unauthenticated remote attacker can send POST /api/user/login requests with 257 distinct nonexistent usernames to fill MaxLoginAttemptRecords and activate a global login lockdown. internal/controller/user_controller.go loginHandler passes each attacker-controlled identifier to internal/service/auth_service.go RecordLoginAttempt, which invokes lockdownMode after the map reaches its cap. IsAccountLocked checks that global state before validating unrelated accounts, causing valid users to receive HTTP 429 until auth.loginTimeout expires, approximately 300 seconds by default. The attack can be repeated, but existing authenticated sessions are not invalidated. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- tinyauthapp tinyauth
fixed in 5.1.0
- github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauthGo
fixed in 1.0.1-0.20260715123057-dade1e2c8f27
- github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauthGo
fixed in 1.0.1-0.20260715123057-dade1e2c8f27