Omnivore Stored Server-Side Request Forgery via the setWebhook Mutation
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fix or patch referenced
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
The setWebhookResolver in packages/api/src/resolvers/webhooks/index.ts stores the caller-supplied url without any address validation, and the file imports no validation helper. When a subscribed event fires, callWebhook in packages/api/src/jobs/call_webhook.ts issues axios.request with that url, the method and Content-Type recorded on the webhook, and a JSON body carrying the event data, so an authenticated user can make the server send repeated attacker-shaped requests to internal endpoints, including link-local metadata addresses. The request is blind: callWebhook discards the result and writes only a success line or the axios error to the server log, so the response is not returned through the API.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- omnivore-app omnivore
fixed in c4d7d8562e6b9aabb1d8e4dabca268e314baa43a