Subpath symlinking on Windows nodes permits NTLM coercion
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
The affected software is the Kubernetes kubelet running on Windows nodes, where a pod's subPath volume mount can be made to resolve to an attacker-controlled network share. The impact is that the kubelet's account NTLM password hash can be exposed, which may allow the password to be cracked or the node to be impersonated through relay on domain-joined systems.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
An NTLM coercion vulnerability exists on Windows nodes when the subPath supplied in a pod's volumeMounts is set to a symbolic link that points to an attacker-controlled network share. When a kubelet resolves symlinks, it does not reject a target that resolves to a UNC path. As a result, the kubelet will transparently attempt to authenticate to the share using NTLM. This allows an attacker to obtain the NetNTLMv2 hash of the account under which the kubelet is running. An attacker could then attempt to crack the hash to retrieve the corresponding password or relay it to impersonate the node, if the node is domain-joined.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Kubernetes Kubernetes
From v1.34.0 · through v1.34.11; From v1.35.0 · through v1.35.8; From v1.36.0 · through v1.36.4; From v1.37.0 · through v1.37.0