RabbitMQ Java client: Frame-level OOM: Math.min(maxInboundMessageBodySize, 0) defeats frame size enforcement
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 5.34.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
The RabbitMQ Java client library allows Java and JVM-based applications to connect to and interact with RabbitMQ nodes. Prior to 5.34.0, AMQConnection.start() applies Math.min(maxInboundMessageBodySize, frameMax) after Connection.Tune negotiation even though AMQP defines frameMax value zero as unlimited and ConnectionFactory.DEFAULT_FRAME_MAX is zero. When the client default and server-negotiated value are both zero, the result is passed to Utils.framePayloadLimit(int), which interprets zero as Integer.MAX_VALUE and disables the configured maxInboundMessageBodySize cap. A malicious AMQP server, or a man-in-the-middle attacker able to modify Connection.Tune and inject frames into the connection, can then send an oversized frame of any frame type, causing Frame.readFrom() to allocate a large byte array before content-level validation and potentially terminate the client process through memory exhaustion. This issue is fixed in version 5.34.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- rabbitmq rabbitmq-java-client
fixed in 5.34.0
- com.rabbitmq:amqp-clientMaven
fixed in 5.34.0