Novu: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via Chat Provider Webhook URLs
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 3.18.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Novu provides an API for sending notifications through multiple channels. Prior to 3.18.0, Novu accepts chat webhook URLs from subscriber credentials.webhookUrl, channel endpoint endpoint.url, event payload.webhookUrl, and event overrides.webhookUrl, then passes the selected endpoint.url through send-message-chat.usecase.ts to raw HTTP requests in the Slack, Discord, Mattermost, Microsoft Teams, Grafana On-Call, Ryver, Rocket.Chat, GetStream, and Zulip providers. An authenticated user can supply an internal or otherwise restricted destination because these paths do not apply normalizeOutboundHttpUrl, assertSafeOutboundUrl, or the DNS-pinned safeOutboundJsonRequest protection used by the generic webhook providers. The Novu worker can consequently issue attacker-directed POST requests to internal network services and cause interactions or actions supported by those services. This issue is fixed in version 3.18.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- novuhq novu
fixed in 3.18.0
- @novu api-service
fixed in 3.18.0