Trigger.dev: Cross-tenant object store read and write via URL path traversal
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 4.5.0-rc.5
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Trigger.dev is a platform for building and deploying fully managed AI agents and workflows. From 4.4.2 until 4.5.0-rc.5, Aws4FetchClient.buildUrl() and Aws4FetchClient.presign() in apps/webapp/app/v3/objectStoreClient.server.ts assign user-controlled packet keys to URL.pathname, while apps/webapp/app/routes/api.v1.packets.$.ts accepts params["*"] without rejecting dot segments and uses findResource: async () => 1 without per-resource ownership validation. WHATWG path normalization collapses .. segments before signing, allowing a caller with a valid environment API key to obtain presigned URLs for another tenant's object-store keys and read or overwrite task payloads. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0-rc.5.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- triggerdotdev trigger.dev
From 4.4.2 · fixed in 4.5.0-rc.5