CVE-2026-73656
Trigger.dev: Cross-project deployment worker registration can modify another project's deployment state
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 4.5.2
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
CISA's decision points: whether it is exploited, whether attacks can be automated, and how much control an attacker gets. Assessed (SSVC 2.0.3).What do these mean? →
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Trigger.dev is a platform for building and deploying fully managed AI agents and workflows. Prior to 4.5.6, POST /api/v1/deployments/:deploymentId/background-workers calls CreateDeploymentBackgroundWorkerServiceV4.call() in apps/webapp/app/v3/services/createDeploymentBackgroundWorkerV4.server.ts, where workerDeployment.findFirst() selects a deployment by friendlyId without an environmentId predicate. A caller with a valid API key for one project can submit another project's deployment identifier, link an attacker-owned background worker to the victim deployment, and move the victim deployment from BUILDING to DEPLOYING. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.6.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- triggerdotdev trigger.dev
fixed in 4.5.2