OpenDJ: Authorization bypass in SASL PLAIN allowing a `proxied-auth` holder to impersonate any resolvable non-root user without an ACI proxy grant
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 5.1.2
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
OpenDJ is an LDAPv3 compliant directory service. Prior to 5.1.2, the SASL PLAIN authorization identity path in opendj-server-legacy/src/main/java/org/opends/server/extensions/PlainSASLMechanismHandler.java checked the PROXIED_AUTH privilege but did not evaluate the mayProxy proxy ACI scope when an authzid resolved to a different user. Both dn: and u: or bare authzid forms could therefore let an authenticated account holding PROXIED_AUTH assume any resolvable non-root identity outside the identities permitted by its proxy ACI. The fix returns INVALID_CREDENTIALS (49) before password verification when the target authorization identity is not permitted. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.2.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- OpenIdentityPlatform OpenDJ
fixed in 5.1.2
- org.openidentityplatform.opendj:opendj-server-legacyMaven
fixed in 5.1.2