CVE-2026-73087GHSA-P2W3-6X73-2F6XGO-2026-6440
Dozzle: SSRF guard bypass via IPv6 transition addresses (6to4/NAT64/Teredo) in webhook notification dispatcher
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 10.6.15, 1.29.1-0.20260804193351-8cf7ccd5ee04
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
CISA's decision points: whether it is exploited, whether attacks can be automated, and how much control an attacker gets. Assessed (SSVC 2.0.3).What do these mean? →
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Dozzle is a realtime log viewer for docker containers. From 10.5.2 until 10.6.15, the isBlockedIP SSRF guard in internal/notification/dispatcher/webhook.go, used by safeDialContext for webhook notification URLs, does not inspect IPv4 addresses embedded in 6to4, NAT64, Teredo, or IPv4-compatible IPv6 addresses, allowing an authenticated user to reach loopback or link-local targets that the guard intends to block. This issue is fixed in version 10.6.15.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- amir20 dozzle
fixed in 10.6.15
- github.com/amir20/dozzleGo
fixed in 1.29.1-0.20260804193351-8cf7ccd5ee04