net/sched: cake: reject overhead values that underflow length
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cake: reject overhead values that underflow length CAKE accepts signed overhead values and stores them in an s16, but the adjusted packet length calculation uses unsigned arithmetic. A negative effective length can therefore wrap to a large value. Such configurations make rate accounting depend on integer wraparound rather than on the packet size userspace intended to model. A static netlink lower bound is not enough because packets reaching CAKE can be smaller than any reasonable manual-overhead allowance. Fold the signed overhead adjustment into the existing datapath MPU clamp so negative adjusted lengths are clamped before link-layer framing adjustments.
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
Version range not reported
- Linux Linux
4.19
References 8
git.kernel.org
- stable/c/f511dd7bf6077aa7afbe72914520553fedaacbb4
- stable/c/e1df6cff03aad8c96e55a8b2a991e505c7a3ff6f
- stable/c/297f459865360b46a887667cbf3aac6a6f013841
- stable/c/336c1e414fc0e9844d445174e8ada2a7dd8d1c4b
- stable/c/bcdf3a3664f7d2c4e37e155f30f72ef33f041804
- stable/c/7aa0e64fea778a9e3df73e64da95367ff8ad2ea5
- stable/c/f1e7807df5bf2d42a40266430e9f82f37633cdcf
- stable/c/b7f97cae7ec1b6c3c32843c42be218690d310467