ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing sof_parse_token_sets() reads array->size while iterating over topology private data. The loop condition only checks that some data remains, so a malformed topology with a truncated trailing vendor array can make the parser read the size field before a full vendor-array header is available. Validate that the remaining private data contains a complete snd_soc_tplg_vendor_array header before reading array->size. The declared array size check also needs to remain signed. asize is an int, but sizeof(*array) has type size_t, so comparing them directly promotes negative asize values to unsigned and lets them pass the check, as reported in the stable review thread reference below. Cast sizeof(*array) to int when validating the declared array size. This rejects negative, zero and otherwise too-small sizes before the parser dispatches to the tuple-specific code.

Timeline

1. Aug 15, 2026, 5:55 AM UTCCVE published
2. Aug 17, 2026, 5:12 AM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• Linux Linux

  From 6.6.136 · fixed in 6.6.145; From 6.12.83 · fixed in 6.12.97; From 6.18.24 · fixed in 6.18.40; From 6.19.14 · fixed in 6.20

• Linux Linux

  7.0

References 5