sunrpc: pin svc_xprt across the asynchronous TLS handshake callback
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 6.6.145, 6.12.97, 6.18.40, 7.1.5
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: total
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: pin svc_xprt across the asynchronous TLS handshake callback svc_tcp_handshake() stores the raw svc_xprt pointer in tls_handshake_args.ta_data and submits the request through tls_server_hello_x509(). The handshake core takes only sock_hold(req->hr_sk); nothing references the embedding struct svc_sock that svc_tcp_handshake_done() reaches via container_of(). Two close races leave the in-flight callback writing through a freed svc_sock. svc_sock_free() calls tls_handshake_cancel() and discards its return value: a false return means handshake_complete() has already set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED but hp_done() may not have finished, yet svc_sock_free() proceeds to kfree(svsk). The cancel-loser fall-through inside svc_tcp_handshake() itself produces the same window: when wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() returns <= 0 (timeout or signal) and tls_handshake_cancel() returns false, the function does not drain, returns, and svc_handle_xprt() calls svc_xprt_received(), which clears XPT_BUSY and can drop the last reference. A concurrent close then runs svc_sock_free() while svc_tcp_handshake_done() is still updating xpt_flags and walking svsk->sk_handshake_done. The corruption surfaces as set_bit/clear_bit RMW into the freed xpt_flags slab slot and as complete_all() walking and writing the freed wait_queue_head_t list embedded in sk_handshake_done -- a slab-corruption primitive, not a benign read. The path is reachable on any TLS-enabled NFS server whenever a connection close overlaps the tlshd downcall delivery window; the interruptible wait means signal delivery suffices, not just SVC_HANDSHAKE_TO expiry. Take svc_xprt_get(xprt) immediately before tls_server_hello_x509() so the in-flight callback owns its own reference. Release it on the two edges where the callback is guaranteed not to fire -- submission failure from tls_server_hello_x509() and a successful tls_handshake_cancel() -- and at the tail of svc_tcp_handshake_done() after complete_all(). [cel: rewrote commit message to describe the actual change]
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
From b3cbf98e2fdf3cb147a95161560cd25987284330 · fixed in f3b55945dd99f29d83e1965d0141040a35262346; From b3cbf98e2fdf3cb147a95161560cd25987284330 · fixed in 2d4f97d13fff91e0bc539216be88b884b544d49f; From b3cbf98e2fdf3cb147a95161560cd25987284330 · fixed in 3f9ee75a97a769be258784c22b89657acb5ed9bd; From b3cbf98e2fdf3cb147a95161560cd25987284330 · fixed in 083e9c2ec7e8bb13b79c9fd7b337abdd758ecc5f; From b3cbf98e2fdf3cb147a95161560cd25987284330 · fixed in 4f988f3a2808fb659f3880c282041ff067acad78
- Linux Linux
6.4
- KernelLinux
From 6.4.0 · fixed in 6.6.145; From 6.7.0 · fixed in 6.12.97; From 6.13.0 · fixed in 6.18.40; From 6.19.0 · fixed in 7.1.5