fs/ntfs3: bound copy_lcns dp->page_lcns[] index in analysis pass
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 6.1.178, 6.6.145, 6.12.97, 6.18.40, 7.1.5
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: bound copy_lcns dp->page_lcns[] index in analysis pass In log_replay()'s analysis pass, after find_dp() returns a valid DIR_PAGE_ENTRY for the (target_attr, target_vcn) tuple, the copy_lcns block walks lrh->lcns_follow further entries: t16 = le16_to_cpu(lrh->lcns_follow); for (i = 0; i < t16; i++) { size_t j = (size_t)(le64_to_cpu(lrh->target_vcn) - le64_to_cpu(dp->vcn)); dp->page_lcns[j + i] = lrh->page_lcns[i]; } find_dp() only validates that target_vcn falls within [dp->vcn, dp->vcn + dp->lcns_follow), i.e., that the FIRST cluster is covered. The walk through the further entries is not bounded against dp->lcns_follow. For a malformed LRH where target_vcn = dp->vcn + dp->lcns_follow - 1 and lrh->lcns_follow > 1, the i > 0 writes overflow the dp's allocated page_lcns[] array. Add the missing j + lrh->lcns_follow <= dp->lcns_follow guard. Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 as a slab-out-of-bounds write of size 8 from log_replay+0x68d4 on the mount path. This is distinct from Pavitra Jha's 2026-05-02 patch ("fs/ntfs3: validate lcns_follow in log_replay conversion", <20260502154252.164586-1-jhapavitra98@gmail.com>) which addresses the separate version-0 dirty-page-table conversion path's memmove(&dp->vcn, ...) call. The two fixes are complementary; both should land. [almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: clang-formatted the changes, fixed conflicts]
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
From b46acd6a6a627d876898e1c84d3f84902264b445 · fixed in 9b3d8cc9d54fcded4de51b2b1026ae7182512077; From b46acd6a6a627d876898e1c84d3f84902264b445 · fixed in 9b7c28d8c61bdb041936222a09a708531a1c2921; From b46acd6a6a627d876898e1c84d3f84902264b445 · fixed in 0f13e823bf86bd1800168ea0bb5bca8b8500a81c; From b46acd6a6a627d876898e1c84d3f84902264b445 · fixed in d240cd98f5f7b65c90f6b2b6abe3232ccdc405ab; From b46acd6a6a627d876898e1c84d3f84902264b445 · fixed in 49c86dae0c0ccb8d98ddcdc46987259389c816dd; From b46acd6a6a627d876898e1c84d3f84902264b445 · fixed in 5e7b598660cfa8e5af172cf4c65cffc126333307
- Linux Linux
5.15
- KernelLinux
From 5.15.0 · fixed in 6.1.178; From 6.2.0 · fixed in 6.6.145; From 6.7.0 · fixed in 6.12.97; From 6.13.0 · fixed in 6.18.40; From 6.19.0 · fixed in 7.1.5