In OpenStack Glance before 32.0.1, the location API does not validate destination hosts when adding an HTTP location to an image.
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 30.2.1, 31.1.1, 32.0.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
In OpenStack Glance before 32.0.1, the location API does not validate destination hosts when adding an HTTP location to an image. Unlike the web-download import path, the location API only checks the URL scheme and does not apply the import_filtering_opts host restrictions. An authenticated user can add a location pointing to internal endpoints such as the cloud metadata service (169.254.169.254), and retrieve the response by downloading the image data. This affects both the new POST /v2/images/{id}/locations API and the old PATCH API when show_multiple_locations is enabled. Deployments with the HTTP store backend enabled are affected.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- OpenStack Glance
From 16.0.0 · fixed in 30.2.1; From 31.0.0 · fixed in 31.1.1; From 32.0.0 · fixed in 32.0.1