Electron: contextBridge object copy honors prototype setters
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 39.8.9, 40.9.2, 41.2.2, 42.0.0-beta.4
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.9, 40.9.2, 41.2.2, and 42.0.0-beta.4, objects copied across the contextBridge boundary from untrusted content could carry an attacker-influenced prototype, enabling prototype-pollution-style attacks against preload code despite context isolation being enabled. Apps are only affected if their preload code accepts object arguments from untrusted content and reads properties from them without own-property checks, while apps that only accept primitive arguments or validate object arguments are not affected. This issue is fixed in 39.8.9, 40.9.2, 41.2.2, and 42.0.0-beta.4.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- electron electron
fixed in 39.8.9; From 40.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 40.9.2; From 41.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 41.2.2; From 42.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 42.0.0-beta.4
- electronnpm
fixed in 39.8.9
- electronnpm
From 40.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 40.9.2
- electronnpm
From 41.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 41.2.2
- electronnpm
From 42.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 42.0.0-beta.4