Electron: Custom protocol with supportFetchAPI but not corsEnabled allows cross-origin reads
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 39.8.10, 40.9.3, 41.4.0, 42.0.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.10, 40.9.3, 41.4.0, and 42.0.0, a custom scheme registered with supportFetchAPI: true but without corsEnabled: true was not subject to CORS enforcement. A page loaded from a remote origin could therefore fetch() or XMLHttpRequest that scheme cross-origin and read the full response body, rather than the read being blocked. Apps that serve sensitive data from such a scheme and load remote or untrusted content in a renderer are affected. This issue is fixed in versions 39.8.10, 40.9.3, 41.4.0, and 42.0.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- electron electron
fixed in 39.8.10; From 40.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 40.9.3; From 41.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 41.4.0; From 42.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 42.0.0
- electronnpm
From 42.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 42.0.0
- electronnpm
From 41.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 41.4.0
- electronnpm
From 40.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 40.9.3
- electronnpm
fixed in 39.8.10