Guzzle: Noncanonical host can bypass host-based checks

Summary

Guzzle is an extensible PHP HTTP client. Prior to 7.15.2 and 8.0.1, Guzzle gives a transport the request URI as text and supplies the Host header separately. The cURL handlers set CURLOPT_URL to the URI exactly as written and push that Host into CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER; StreamHandler does the same through fopen(). libcurl then parses the authority itself, percent-decoding it and, on an IDN-capable build, applying IDNA mapping, and uses the result to resolve, connect, name the TLS peer and address a proxy CONNECT, while the supplied Host suppresses the aligned one libcurl would have generated. For a URI host written as 127.0.0.%31, filter_var() rejects the host as an IP literal, yet libcurl decodes it to 127.0.0.1 and reaches loopback with no DNS lookup while the server receives Host: 127.0.0.%31. An attacker who influences a fetched URI can therefore reach a host the application's checks excluded and read whatever the host exposes of the response. The same divergence moves Guzzle's own decisions onto a spelling the transport does not use: no_proxy selects proxy routing from the literal host, and RedirectMiddleware decides from it whether to strip Authorization and Cookie. Exploitation requires the application to build a request URI from untrusted input and to make a host decision before handing it to Guzzle. This issue is fixed in versions 7.15.2 and 8.0.1.

Timeline

1. Aug 3, 2026, 9:07 PM UTCCVE published
2. Aug 4, 2026, 2:06 PM UTCCISA SSVC assessment

   Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial

3. Aug 4, 2026, 2:06 PM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• guzzle guzzle

  From 8.0.0 · fixed in 8.0.1; fixed in 7.15.2

• guzzlehttp/guzzlePackagist

  fixed in 7.15.2

• guzzlehttp/guzzlePackagist

  From 8.0.0 · fixed in 8.0.1

References 7