Coturn: STUN attributes after MESSAGE-INTEGRITY are processed, letting on-path attackers modify authenticated TURN requests
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 4.15.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Coturn is a free open source implementation of TURN and STUN Server. Prior to 4.15.0, an on-path attacker can append attributes after MESSAGE-INTEGRITY to an authenticated STUN request on plain UDP or TCP, adjust the STUN header length, and recompute the unkeyed FINGERPRINT while the original HMAC remains valid because it covers only the message prefix. Server-side parsing in src/server/ns_turn_server.c continues past MESSAGE-INTEGRITY through handle_turn_allocate(), handle_turn_create_permission(), handle_turn_refresh(), and handle_turn_command(), allowing trailing LIFETIME, XOR-PEER-ADDRESS, or ORIGIN attributes to override allocation lifetime, inject a permission, or bypass the origin check. TLS and DTLS deployments prevent this in-transit modification. This issue is fixed in version 4.15.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- coturn coturn
fixed in 4.15.0