usb: gadget: uvc: clamp SEND_RESPONSE length to the response buffer
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: uvc: clamp SEND_RESPONSE length to the response buffer uvc_send_response() builds the UVC control response from a user-supplied struct uvc_request_data: req->length = min_t(unsigned int, uvc->event_length, data->length); ... memcpy(req->buf, data->data, req->length); req->length is clamped to uvc->event_length, which is taken from the host control request wLength (up to UVC_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE, 64), and to data->length, which comes from the UVCIOC_SEND_RESPONSE ioctl and is only checked for being negative. The source buffer data->data is only 60 bytes, so a response with uvc->event_length and data->length both greater than 60 makes memcpy() read past the end of data->data. Clamp req->length to sizeof(data->data) as well.
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
Version range not reported
- Linux Linux
3.10
References 8
git.kernel.org
- stable/c/eaf783c005299a702f2cc96b08cd21ede081f098
- stable/c/568e68d8f80395a64848aa2946af8ade72da0ffb
- stable/c/82ec2c1e456b17451f0736c3983402642f961733
- stable/c/4e116372b7a4f87df0dc0ed4b0ab5b0bb0cc5796
- stable/c/662f6c6c6ff8a6c508e1646c09cae74e28f3cca6
- stable/c/1f03658f3e9b2f8fd1d1003ba389a0390b49a350
- stable/c/c8510fbbea09ef0170b56b14dc2b5890dc75be07
- stable/c/b70dc75e85ba968b7b76eebfe5d63000080b875b