fuse-uring: fix race between registration and connection abortion

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse-uring: fix race between registration and connection abortion This fixes this race: • thread a: io_uring_enter -> register sqe -> fuse_uring_create_ring_ent -> allocate ent but doesn't grab queue_ref yet • thread b: fuse_conn_destroy() -> fuse_chan_abort() -> fuse_uring_abort() is a no-op due to queue ref being 0 • thread a: grabs the queue_ref, queue_ref is now 1, rest of fuse_uring_do_register() logic executes • thread b: fuse_chan_abort() returns, fuse_chan_wait_aborted() now runs and calls "wait_event(ring->stop_waitq, atomic_read(&ring->queue_refs) == 0);" The abort/unmount thread will hang indefinitely in unkillable state as nothing will decrement queue_refs or wake stop_waitq, and the ring, queue, and ent are leaked. Fix this by checking fch->connected under fch->lock after the created ent has grabbed a ref count on the queue. This ensures that in the scenario above, it is guaranteed that we either release the queue ref and wake up stop_waitq (in case fuse_chan_wait_aborted() is already waiting) in fuse_uring_do_register() when we detect !fch->connected, or if the connection is aborted after the check, it is guaranteed that the async teardown worker will be running in the background cleaning up ents and decrementing the ent's ref on the queue, which will unblock the eventual queue and ring teardown.

Timeline

1. Aug 10, 2026, 11:58 AM UTCCVE published
2. Aug 17, 2026, 4:58 AM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• Linux Linux

  Version range not reported

• Linux Linux

  6.14

References 3