RabbitMQ: Web MQTT with PROXY Protocol enabled: a loopback-only user permission bypass
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 4.3.3, 4.2.9, 4.1.14, 4.0.23, 3.13.18
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.18, 4.0.23, 4.1.14, 4.2.9, and 4.3.3, native MQTT and MQTT over WebSocket behind a trusted PROXY Protocol frontend could lose the proxy-derived client address before the MQTT authentication path checked loopback_users, causing the frontend-to-broker address to be treated as loopback. An attacker who can reach the trusted frontend and has valid credentials for a loopback-restricted account can therefore bypass the source-address restriction; the issue does not bypass password authentication. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.18, 4.0.23, 4.1.14, 4.2.9, and 4.3.3.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- rabbitmq rabbitmq-server
From 4.3.0 · fixed in 4.3.3; From 4.2.0 · fixed in 4.2.9; From 4.1.0 · fixed in 4.1.14; From 4.0.0 · fixed in 4.0.23; From 3.13.0 · fixed in 3.13.18
- rabbitmqBitnami
From 3.13.0 · fixed in 3.13.18; From 4.0.0 · fixed in 4.0.23; From 4.1.0 · fixed in 4.1.14; From 4.2.0 · fixed in 4.2.9; From 4.3.0 · fixed in 4.3.3