RabbitMQ: ReDoS via AMQP 1.0 SQL filter LIKE wildcard

Summary

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1, pattern_to_regex maps % -> .*? and _ -> ., then compiles ^...$ with only [unicode]; re:run is called with only [{capture, none}] - no explicit match_limit. A pattern like %_%_..._%X becomes ^.*?..*?.....*?.X$ with overlapping lazy quantifiers. The whole-expression cap is ?MAX_EXPRESSION_LENGTH=4096 chars / ?MAX_TOKENS=200; a LIKE string literal is one token, so ~2000 %_ pairs fit. SQL filters are accepted unconditionally at rabbit_amqp_session.erl:3264 (no feature flag). Evaluated per-message at rabbit_stream_queue.erl:1439. OTP's default 10M match_limit caps each match at ~100-200 ms (not seconds), and the re NIF yields to the scheduler. An authenticated AMQP 1.0 consumer with read+write on a stream queue can cause ~100-200 ms of CPU per delivered message via a crafted LIKE filter, multiplied across thousands of messages and parallel sessions - a substantial backtracking-driven CPU amplification. Preconditions include AMQP 1.0 with stream queues in use Attacker can attach a receiver with a filter (read permission) and publish messages with long property values (write permission). This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1.

Timeline

1. Sep 23, 2026, 8:19 PM UTCCVE published
2. Sep 24, 2026, 2:24 PM UTCCISA SSVC assessment

   Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial

3. Sep 24, 2026, 2:24 PM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• rabbitmq rabbitmq-server

  From 4.2.0 · fixed in 4.2.7; From 4.3.0 · fixed in 4.3.1

• rabbitmqBitnami

  From 4.2.0 · fixed in 4.2.7; From 4.3.0 · fixed in 4.3.1

References 3