RabbitMQ: Plaintext username:password stored in an insecure cookie after successful POST /login
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 4.2.8, 4.3.2
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 4.2.0 until 4.2.8 and 4.3.2, a successful POST /login caused is_authorized/2 to set an auth cookie containing base64-encoded username:password credentials without HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite, or expiration protections. Because base64 is encoding rather than encryption, an attacker with same-origin cross-site scripting, an HTTP-readable network position, or local access to the browser cookie store could recover the actual login credentials; older browsers that treated an absent SameSite attribute as None also sent the cookie cross-site. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.8 and 4.3.2.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- rabbitmq rabbitmq-server
From 4.2.0 · fixed in 4.2.8; From 4.3.0 · fixed in 4.3.2
- rabbitmqBitnami
From 4.2.0 · fixed in 4.2.8; From 4.3.0 · fixed in 4.3.2